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Article 
The Green Option 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In this Article we advance a new policy tool designed to re-
invigorate investment in green technologies. We propose that 
green companies be given an option to transfer a block of their 
shares to any corporation of their choice. Making established 
corporations shareholders in green companies will incentivize 
them to switch to environmentally friendly technologies and 
use their political clout to alleviate legal, regulatory, and politi-
cal barriers to the adoption of such technologies. In short, giv-
ing established corporations a stake in green companies will 
give them a stake in the environment. Concretely, we propose 
enacting legislation that will empower green companies that 
meet certain conditions to transfer a call option to buy a block 
of its shares to an established company of their choice. The op-
tion will be given for free; the established company that re-
ceives the option will not have to pay anything for it initially. 
The exercise price will be the price of the green company’s 
share at the time of the transfer and the receiving company will 
have a period of five years to exercise. We call this novel mech-
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anism the “green option.” What distinguishes the green option 
from standard call options is that unlike regular call options 
that simply expire on their maturity date, in our case, the es-
tablished company will be legally mandated to exercise the op-
tion at the end of the five-year period, even at a loss. Allowing 
the option to expire is not an option for the established firm.  
A concrete example can help illustrate our proposal. Green 
NRG Co. is a startup company that develops a new technology 
for producing clean energy. Brown Inc. is a large corporation 
that operates power plants in several coastal states. Under our 
proposal, Green NRG would be able to transfer a free call op-
tion to buy 1,000,000 of its shares to Brown Inc. Assume that 
the call option was transferred in 2012 when a share of Green 
NRG was worth $1. Brown Inc. will have until 2017 to exercise 
the option. Since Brown Inc. can’t just let the option expire, it 
will make an effort to ensure that Green NRG’s shares appreci-
ate in value. For example, if the value of Green NRG’s shares 
goes up to $3 per share, Brown Inc. will have a $2 million prof-
it. If, on the other hand, Green NRG’s technology fails and the 
share price falls to $0.10 per share, Brown Inc. will lose 
$900,000.  
The proposed mechanism will give established firms an in-
centive to help the green technology in which they are invested 
to succeed in the marketplace. And if technological change and 
innovation are to truly help us bridge the gap between growing 
wants and resource-based constraints in the world, such new 
ideas as ours must be put on the table. Currently, the world is 
facing an idea crunch on the right kind of policy levers to en-
hance green technology investment. The incorrect setting of 
subsidies has forced European countries to withdraw or drasti-
cally reduce these incentives.1 Extant market instruments such 
as tradable green certificates or renewable portfolio standards 
focus largely on energy efficiency and have had only marginal 
impact on technology changes. These market instruments have 
failed to drive up innovation—especially in the case of new en-
ergy-efficient technologies that are in their nascent stage,2 and 
 
 1. FRANKFURT SCH.-UNEP COLLABORATING CTR. FOR CLIMATE & SUS-
TAINABLE ENERGY FIN., GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 
2013, at 38 (2013), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/GTR-UNEP-FS 
-BNEF2.pdf. 
 2. Anna Bergek & Staffan Jacobsson, Are Tradable Green Certificates a 
Cost-Efficient Policy Driving Technical Change or a Rent-Generating Machine? 
Lessons from Sweden 2003–2008, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 1255, 1266–67 (2010). 
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green technologies that are better but involve higher cost3—or 
to enhance dynamic efficiency.4 When presented with an option, 
private actors tend to prefer cheaper and more conventional 
green technologies, resulting in lesser innovation in third gen-
eration green technologies.5 In contrast, we think our proposal 
is a way to increase corporate social responsibility without un-
necessary tinkering with ordinary market processes. It increas-
es the range of instruments to be analyzed by environmental 
law and economics scholars, and to be discussed in policy cir-
cles and ultimately in the legislature.6 
From a legal standpoint, the mechanism we propose is not 
unprecedented. The use of forced transfers is not foreign to the 
law. For example, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the 
Supreme Court upheld as constitutional legislation that em-
powered tenants to force an ownership transfer upon their 
landlord.7 The legislation was adopted to ameliorate land con-
centration problems. Furthermore, in the nineteenth century, 
railroad companies were given the power to take private prop-
erty in exchange for the payment of compensation.8 The goal of 
the forced transactions in this case was to facilitate train 
transportation—the cutting edge technology of the time. Com-
 
 3. Aviel Verbruggen & Volkmar Lauber, Assessing the Performance of 
Renewable Electricity Support Instruments, 45 ENERGY POL’Y 635, 640 (2012). 
 4. Id. at 641. 
 5. Nick Johnstone et al., Renewable Energy Policies and Technological 
Innovation: Evidence Based on Patent Counts, 45 ENVTL. RESOURCE ECON. 
133, 134, 147–48, 151 (2010). 
 6. For a fairly recent and reasonably comprehensive account, see ALFRED 
ENDRES, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 130–40, 187–201 
(2011) (focusing on dynamic incentives and technological change as drivers of 
better environmental policies). This exposition, moreover, shows how much 
the distinct perspectives of (environmental) law and economics have converged 
in the best practices of mainstream environmental economics, thus further 
lowering the potential for controversy around this particular branch of inter-
disciplinary legal scholarship. 
 7. 467 U.S. 229, 239–43 (1984).  
 8. See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 517 (2009) 
(“[P]rivate takings—that is, takings carried out by nongovernmental actors—
have a solid basis in our legal system.”); Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About 
Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 84–85 (2011) (“There is a long his-
tory in the United States, dating back to colonial times, of delegating takings 
power to private parties—such as developers of milldams and railroads—so 
that they can take property directly for socially beneficial uses without having 
the government act as an intermediary.”). Even today, state and local govern-
ments routinely delegate their takings power to private development corpora-
tions for land assembly purposes. Bell, supra, at 549–50.  
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pared to these and other historical precedents, our proposed 
scheme is far less intrusive and controversial.  
That said, we are cognizant of the fact that our proposal 
constitutes an economic imposition on established companies. 
One might argue that forcing established companies to accept a 
call option on the shares of green companies is tantamount to 
imposing a tax on them, or, more accurately, forcing them to 
subsidize green production. There is a kernel of truth to this 
argument, but it is largely overstated. It is critical to under-
stand that unlike direct taxation, our proposal also creates a 
meaningful potential upside for established companies. The rub 
lies elsewhere: the real concern our proposal raises relates to 
the level of risk to which we expose established companies. 
Many producers of green technologies are startup companies 
that face a very uncertain business future. After all, most 
startups have a short commercial life expectancy and the like-
lihood of their failure far exceeds that of their success. This 
concern is real. However, it can be alleviated via the adoption 
of a simple constraint. The legislation we propose should be 
confined to green companies that (a) have a proven working 
technology that has been commercialized; and (b) have been in 
business for at least five years. The introduction of these twin 
conditions will significantly reduce the potential risk our pro-
posal poses for established firms.  
Furthermore, we believe that this risk is worth taking giv-
en the proposal’s potential upside. A recent study reveals a 
steep fall of twenty-nine percent in the 2012 investment figures 
for green technologies in developed countries.9 Developed na-
tions and conglomerates within, who have stronger leverage to 
resolve the problem, are balking from the solution.10 The rec-
orded decline suggests that the time has come to think afresh 
about the interface between law, business, and the environ-
ment.  
The adoption of our proposal will have several salutary ef-
fects. First, it will facilitate market adoption of green technolo-
gies. It bears emphasis that we are by no means arguing that 
green technology will never be adopted without our mechanism. 
Rather, we submit that implementing our proposal will accel-
erate the pace at which green technologies are adopted. It is 
important to understand that the introduction of any technolo-
 
 9. See FRANKFURT SCH.-UNEP COLLABORATING CTR. FOR CLIMATE & 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FIN., supra note 1, at 20.  
 10. Id. at 13–14. 
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gy—green or not—is an uphill battle. Technological changes 
are costly for businesses. Even technologies that can clearly re-
duce operation costs or increase profits may not be adopted on 
account of short horizons and legal concerns. Specifically, the 
adoption of unproven technologies may expose companies to 
production glitches and enhanced liability. Technological 
changes invariably involve switching costs and uncertainty, 
and these two effects combine to create a certain status quo bi-
as. When the technology at issue is only marginally better than 
the prevailing technology, profit-maximizing corporations will 
often decide to pass them up.  
Insofar as green technologies are concerned, the barrier to 
entry is even greater. Green technologies often fall under the 
category of “disruptive technologies”11—innovations that may 
compromise performance in the short term but yield considera-
ble benefits in the long run.12 As Clayton Christensen persua-
sively argued, established companies have all the incentives of 
marketplace incumbents: they are reluctant to adopt technolo-
gies that challenge existing production paradigms and prefer to 
hold steadfastly to the dominant technology they currently 
use.13 Moreover, green technologies often produce social bene-
fits—both tangible and ideological—that cannot fully be cap-
tured by market prices. In that sense, they present the mirror-
image problem of that analyzed by R.H. Coase in his seminal 
The Problem of Social Cost.14 Giving established business a 
share in the upside of green companies will make them more 
welcoming to green technologies, and if the upside is large 
enough, it may even convert them into champions of green 
technologies.  
Second, and relatedly, having a stake in green technologies 
will induce the holding companies and their business partners 
to come up with complementary products and processes. This, 
in turn, will increase the demand for green technologies and 
reduce barriers to entry for other environmentally minded 
 
 11. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT COMPANIES TO FAIL, at xv (1997). 
 12. Id. Electric cars provide a perfect example. At present, the perfor-
mance of electric cars is inferior to that of cars operated by gas and it is more 
cumbersome to own an electric car. However, in the long term, the perfor-
mance of electric cars is likely to equal, if not surpass, that of gas cars, and the 
costs associated with electric cars both to the owner and to society at large will 
be much lower.  
 13. Id. at 9–24, 29–56. 
 14. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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businesses. Over time, this dynamic may result in a virtuous 
cycle that will transform the attitude of the business communi-
ty toward environmentally friendly goods. From a broader so-
cial perspective, the gains will be even greater on account of the 
positive spillovers of green technologies.  
Third, our proposal can go a long way toward leveling the 
political playing field. To get a handle on this effect, it is im-
perative to understand that legal and regulatory environments 
can dramatically affect the fate of new technologies. There is a 
rich theoretical and empirical economic literature showing that 
laws and regulations are adopted at the behest of influential 
business interests to create a barrier to entry for new entrants. 
The environmental domain is no exception. Established busi-
nesses with political clout can effectively bar entry of green in-
novation. One only needs to think about the obstacles to the in-
troduction of electric cars to see the role of the political system 
in channeling innovation. The political environment would be 
very different, however, if incumbent firms had an interest in 
the success of green companies. The partial alignment of inter-
est our proposal is intended to bring about will amplify the 
voice of green interests in the political world and will give them 
meaningful representation in the political process. This, in 
turn, may result in more environmentally-oriented policies and 
laws.  
Fourth, and finally, our proposal is superior to various sub-
sidization schemes as it relies almost exclusively on the mar-
ket. Subsidization of green technologies is not only potentially 
wasteful of taxpayer money, but may also lead to serious mar-
ket distortions. Subsidization introduces the risk of favoritism. 
Politicians may elect to funnel money to their potential sup-
porters rather than to the most meritorious green firms. Fur-
thermore, subsidization decisions are made early on in the 
technology-development process and under conditions of ex-
treme uncertainty. As a result, even bracketing out concerns 
about favoritism, subsidization may result in the funding of the 
wrong companies. The relatively low success rate of venture 
capital funds and other private institutions in picking startups 
should serve as a warning sign to anyone who thinks that the 
government will do a better job. Our mechanism, by contrast, 
stimulates market competition and revelation of information. 
We leave it to the green companies themselves to decide wheth-
er and to whom to put their options. Our proposal fosters true 
market experimentation by lowering barriers to entry. It does 
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not risk public money. Consequently, it does not impose a cost 
on the public.  
Structurally, this Article unfolds in three parts. In Part I, 
we discuss the legal and business obstacles faced by green 
technologies. We demonstrate that under the current legal re-
gime, green technologies are unfairly disadvantaged relative to 
conventional technologies. We argue that this state of affairs is 
unwarranted and thus requires policymakers to level the play-
ing field. In Part II, we introduce the green option mechanism, 
explain how it should be operationalized and assess its 
strengths and weaknesses. We then proceed to compare it to al-
ternative state-sponsored mechanisms, such as subsidization, 
that are commonly used to support socially desirable activities 
and show that our mechanism is vastly superior. Finally, in 
Part III, we address potential objections to our proposal. A 
short Conclusion ensues.  
I.  IT AIN’T EASY BEING GREEN   
Although some people erroneously assume a perfectly com-
petitive marketplace is one in which new technologies instan-
taneously replace older ones, in reality, the road to commercial 
success is long and treacherous. As a matter of fact, “[m]ost 
technological innovations do not survive the transition from in-
vention to marketplace success.”15 Innovative technologies, 
among them green ones, must traverse a host of regulatory and 
financial obstacles before they are adopted. In this Part, we will 
enumerate and discuss the legal and economic challenges faced 
by green technologies. We will demonstrate that green technol-
ogies are currently required to compete on a slanted playing 
field; the odds are stacked overwhelmingly against them. In 
light of this fact, and given the social desirability of green inno-
vation, in Part II we will propose a way to facilitate the intro-
duction of environmentally friendly technologies. But, first, we 
would like to elucidate the many obstacles green technologies 
encounter on their way to markets.  
A. LEGAL BARRIERS 
Technological competition is a desirable phenomenon, one 
we most certainly welcome. Technological competition is the 
 
 15. Marilyn A. Brown & Sharon (Jess) Chandler, Governing Confusion: 
How Statutes, Fiscal Policy, and Regulations Impede Clean Energy Technolo-
gies, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 472, 473 (2008). 
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mechanism by which older technologies are replaced by newer, 
more effective ones. It is important to realize, however, that the 
process is far from perfect. Tempting though it might be to be-
lieve that superior new technologies will always drive inferior 
technologies out of the market, in reality the opposite might 
happen. To understand why, it is critical to explore the effect of 
legal rules and regulations on technological competition. Com-
petition among technologies does not occur in a vacuum. Ra-
ther, it takes place in an institutional environment shaped by 
the law. Law, in turn, may be innovation welcoming or innova-
tion impeding.16 For example, regulations that adopt progres-
sively lower emission rates of greenhouse gases will have the 
effect of spurring cleaner manufacturing processes.17 Contrari-
wise, regulations that mandate treatment of toxic waste in a 
particular uniform way are liable to exert a chilling effect on 
the invention of new treatment technologies.18 Unfortunately, 
in the case of the environment, the law often creates barriers to 
the development and adoption of green technologies. This effect 
may be intended or unintended, but either way it hinders green 
innovation.  
1. Grandfathering and Regulatory Lacunas 
Over the past several decades, Congress has adopted vari-
ous measures to protect the environment.19 Foremost among 
 
 16. In theory, it is possible to imagine a legal regime that adopts a com-
pletely neutral stance to innovation. In reality, this result is virtually impossi-
ble. As the discussion in the text illustrates, there are so many laws and regu-
lations that affect the rate of technological substitution—both directly and 
indirectly—that it is hard to conceive of a state of affairs in which the opposing 
effects precisely cancel each other out.  
 17. See Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Concep-
tion of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 
100–04 (1995). For an economic analysis of how conventional government reg-
ulations can stimulate environmentally friendly innovations, see Joel F. 
Bruneau, A Note on Permits, Standards, and Technological Innovation, 48 J. 
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1192, 1198 (2004); Juan-Pablo Montero, Permits, 
Standards, and Technology Innovation, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 23, 31–
39 (2002).   
 18. See, e.g., Martha L. Noble & J.W. Looney, The Emerging Legal 
Framework for Animal Agricultural Waste Management in Arkansas, 47 ARK. 
L. REV. 159 (1994) (discussing the legal regulations of animal and agricultural 
waste in Arkansas and how those regulations tailor the local efforts to deal 
with polluting waste, including an examination of common law remedies and 
corporate responsibility).  
 19. For general discussion, see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW 67–165 (2004).  
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those are the Clean Air Act,20 the Clean Water Act,21 and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act.22 These laws set various standards intended to 
safeguard important ecological amenities and promote envi-
ronmental goals. At the same time, in response to the demand 
of powerful lobby groups, Congress introduced several excep-
tions and riders that undermined the pro-environmental 
goals.23 The most famous and oft-cited example is the grandfa-
thering of coal plants under the Clean Air Act, which exempted 
most old coal-producing plants from the new performance 
standards.24 This exemption has proven especially detrimental 
to public health25 and clean energy technologies. The high cost 
of compliance with standards set by the Act for new plants 
prompted plant owners to do whatever they could to prolong 
the operation of the old coal facilities.26 The dual regulatory re-
gime created by the Act had another undesirable effect: it 
disincentivized old plant operators from improving their facili-
ties for fear that doing so would change the classification of 
their plants from old to new and subject them to the heightened 
standards that apply to the latter category.27  
 
 20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–671q (2012). The vast majority of the laws were en-
acted in the 1970s. For a comprehensive review, see Richard J. Lazarus, Con-
gressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental 
Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 623–29 (2006). 
 21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–387 (2012).  
 22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–675.  
 23. CURTIS MOORE & ALAN MILLER, GREEN GOLD: JAPAN, GERMANY, THE 
UNITED STATES, AND THE RACE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY 82–84 
(1994); Matthew J. Rizzo, The Endangered Species Act and Federal Agency In-
action, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 855, 874 (1994).  
 24. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–671q; Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. 
Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Eco-
nomics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1681–82 (2007) (dis-
cussing this example and suggesting that it was initially meant to be tempo-
rary). 
 25. According to a 2011 study by the American Lung Association, coal-
fired plants are the most harmful source of industrial pollution in the United 
States. See AM. LUNG ASS’N, TOXIC AIR: THE CASE FOR CLEANING UP COAL-
FIRED POWER PLANTS 1–5 (2011), available at http://www.lung.org/assets/ 
documents/healthy-air/toxic-air-report.pdf.  
 26. This has come to be known as the “old plant effect.” See BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 67–68 (1981) (in-
troducing and explaining this effect).  
 27. See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem with New Source Review, 36 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,095, 10,096–98 (2006). 
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Another disconcerting example is provided by the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA).28 Enacted by Congress in 1976, 
this legislation was supposed to regulate the handling and dis-
posal of potentially dangerous chemicals.29 Unlike other envi-
ronmental laws that have been amended over the years, the 
TSCA remained frozen in time for about three and half dec-
ades. As a result, the standards that apply to toxic substances 
in the United States are out of step with those existing in many 
European countries.30 To make things worse, the legislation 
grandfathered in—without safety testing—over 60,000 indus-
trial chemicals which were in use in 1976, and allowed chemi-
cals that were developed subsequently to enter the market.31 
According to one report, “in the 34 years since the TSCA was 
enacted, the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] has re-
quired testing for only 200 chemicals out of the more than 
80,000 available for use in the United States, and has regulat-
ed only five.”32  
Grandfathering is also ubiquitous in land use regulations. 
Zoning amendments usually exempt existing non-conforming 
uses.33 As a result, land uses that hurt the environment can 
persist unimpeded for a long time. The regulation of residential 
and commercial structures also features extensive grandfather-
ing. Local governments typically apply green building princi-
ples to new structures. Old ones are typically exempt from 
complying with heightened energy standards.34 Although retro-
fitting of old buildings imposes a significant cost on the owner, 
in the long run the energy savings could more than offset it. Al-
so, if owners of existing buildings were required to comply, it 
 
 28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–697 (2012). 
 29. Cynthia Ruggerio, Referral of Toxic Chemical Regulation Under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act: EPA’s Administrative Dumping Ground, 17 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 75, 75, 85–89 (1989). 
 30. Dorit Kerret & Alon Tal, Greenwash or Green Gain? Predicting the 
Success and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Environmental Voluntary Agree-
ments, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 31, 38 (2005).  
31. Bryan Walsh, Regulation of Toxic Chemicals Faces Tightening, TIME 
MAG. (Apr. 16, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599, 
1982489,00.html. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regula-
tions, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1224 (2009) (noting the existence of “a strong 
background rule running throughout the law of property that existing uses are 
entitled to protection from the government”). 
 34. Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 99 (2011). 
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would create an incentive to come up with innovative and more 
cost-effective techniques to accomplish this result. Yet, local 
lawmakers prefer to protect homeowners from transitions. In-
deed, building codes presented a serious obstacle to green con-
struction, at least in the beginning: “The use of alternative 
methods, materials, and designs fell outside of the prescriptions 
in most building codes.”35 As one commentator correctly ob-
served, grandfathering and “[e]xcessive transition relief may 
also create new barriers to entry in a sector by favoring incum-
bents; these barriers, once erected, are difficult to remove.”36 
It is important to understand at this point that laws con-
taining grandfathering provisions are not the worst possible 
outcome for the environment. Regulatory lacunas could lead to 
much worse results. Consider the case of coal ash damping. 
Although scientists are of the opinion that the best way to dis-
pose of coal ash is to bury it in dry landfills equipped with spe-
cial facilities, the favored disposal method used by the industry 
is to store ash coal in wet ponds.37 This method reached public 
awareness in 2009 when it resulted in a spill that effused “a 
billion gallons of toxic sludge across 300 acres of East Tennes-
see.”38 According to one report, there exist over 1,300 ponds like 
the one in East Tennessee nationwide.39 In the last thirty years, 
the EPA has been trying to come up with a regulatory frame-
work to address the handling of ash coal, but so far all its ef-
forts have fallen short.40 In the absence of federal regulation, 
the matter was left for the states. However, there is consensus 
 
 35. Keith H. Hirokawa, At Home with Nature: Early Reflections on Green 
Building Laws and the Transformation of the Built Environment, 39 ENVTL. L. 
507, 521 (2009); see also Alexandra Dapolito Dunn, Siting Green Infrastruc-
ture: Legal and Policy Solutions To Alleviate Urban Poverty and Promote 
Healthy Communities, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 41, 63 (2010) (pointing out 
how downspout disconnection programs, effective in promoting the use of cap-
tured water for irrigation and green roofs, stood deterred by city regulations 
that required downspouts to be connected with storm sewer systems, and rain 
capture was rendered impermissible in certain states because of prior appro-
priation laws).  
 36. Huber, supra note 34, at 93–94; see also Serkin, supra note 33, at 
1261–80, 1281 (stating and explaining how the intuition that existing uses 
demand categorical protection lacks sufficient social justification). 
 37. Coal Ash: Hazardous to Human Health, PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP. 
(Aug. 5, 2013, 3:47 PM), http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/coal-ash-hazardous-to 
-human-health.pdf. 
 38. Shaila Dewan, Hundreds of Coal Ash Dumps Lack Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/us/07sludge.html.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
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among experts that states are ill-equipped to deal with the is-
sue.41 And so, in the absence of effective regulatory oversight, 
power plants naturally elect to handle the matter in the least 
costly way for them, even if it comes at a great cost to the envi-
ronment. Effectively, the current practice of damping ash coal 
is a typical example of an unaccounted for externality that cre-
ates a social cost. This much has been pointed out by law and 
economics scholars a long time ago.42 A less obvious cost is the 
chilling effect of this practice on environmentally friendly inno-
vation. As long as the power industry can externalize harms 
onto the rest of our society at no cost to itself, it has no incen-
tive to adopt greener disposal technologies. This, in turn, 
means that such technologies may never be developed.  
Rigid environmental norms can also result in delayed 
adoption, or absolute curtailing, of transition to green technolo-
gies. For instance, in the baking industry, the EPA requires 
ethanol emission reductions between the range of eighty to 
ninety-five percent for any technology to qualify as a reasona-
bly available control technology (RACT). The EPA has deter-
mined catalytic oxidation to be the only RACT that achieves 
this rigid reduction limit. The fallout of this is that more inno-
vative and cheaper solutions that do not make use of toxic met-
als fail to receive EPA approval, despite their reduction efficacy 
being only slightly lower than the prescribed range. This also 
results in “close enough” cleaner technologies failing to obtain 
the commercial testing, demonstration, and refinement needed 
to improve their performance.43 Similarly, the SO2 emission rate 
limits prior to 1990 created a technology lock-in because many 
electrical utilities were compelled to use scrubbers, an “energy-
intensive technology producing high levels of waste.”44 When 
these rigid limits were replaced with an overall performance 
 
 41. Id.  
 42. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property and 
Positive Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 220–28 (2012) (noting that 
“negative externalities were the key impetus for the development of the law 
and economics movement”). The classic articles on the subject can be found in 
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 111–359 (1920) (suggesting 
that the problem of social cost be addressed by the imposition of tax on the 
private actors responsible for it) and Coase, supra note 14, at 8–15 (arguing 
that when transaction costs are sufficiently low private contracting can ade-
quately address the social cost problem).  
 43. ENVTL. LAW INST., BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY INNO-
VATION AND USE 43 (1998), available at http://www.eli.org/sites/default/ 
files/eli-pubs/d8.01.pdf. 
 44. Id. at 4. 
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standard, cleaner process technologies could easily replace 
scrubbers and deliver the same result at almost half the earlier 
cost.45 Cryptic barriers of this kind are “sticky” because a firm 
that invests in changing a standard would be opening the mar-
ket for its competitors too. This acts as a disincentive, stopping 
them from working towards eliminating the barrier.46 
Another environmentally harmful activity that has evaded 
federal regulation so far is “fracking.” Fracking consists of the 
practice of forcefully injecting fluids into rock cracks in order to 
release gas out of the rock formation and allow it to be extract-
ed.47 By many accounts, the practice of fracking presents a real 
risk to our drinking water. In the past, the wastewater that 
contained a high degree of salt and other harmful minerals was 
dumped, untreated, into rivers.48 The current industry practice 
is to store the water in artificial ponds.49 However, due to leak-
age, some of the wastewater reached underground wells. The 
use of fracking has jeopardized the water supply of areas in 
Pennsylvania and New Mexico.50 To make matters worse, some 
contend that the practice induces earthquakes and that the 
earthquakes in Ohio several years ago were caused by 
fracking.51 Yet, there is no federal regulation pertaining to the 
practice, and the states let the practice continue virtually un-
regulated for decades. Only recently, in response to public out-
cry, states’ environmental agencies turned their attention to 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. ALICE STOVER ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., 
CRYPTIC BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY REPORT NUMBER A135, at 1, 14–15 
(2013), available at http://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
researchreports/a135.pdf. 
 47. See REBECCA HAMMER & JEANNE VANBRIESEN, NATURAL RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL, IN FRACKING’S WAKE: NEW RULES ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT OUR 
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT FROM CONTAMINATED WASTEWATER REPORT 
NUMBER D:12-05-A, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/ 
fracking-wastewater-fullreport.pdf. 
 48. Christopher Joyce, With Gas Boom, Pennsylvania Fears New Toxic 
Legacy, NPR (May 14, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/05/14/ 
149631363/when-fracking-comes-to-town-it-s-water-water-everywhere. 
 49. ELIZABETH RIDLINGTON & JOHN RUMPLER, ENV’T AM. RESEARCH & 
POLICY CTR., FRACKING BY THE NUMBERS: KEY IMPACTS OF DIRTY DRILLING AT 
THE STATE AND NATIONAL LEVEL 10–11 (2013), available at http://www 
.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_FrackingNumber
s_scrn.pdf. 
 50. Id. at 9. 
 51. Id. at 18.  
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this problem.52 The case of fracking demonstrates once more 
that in the absence of comprehensive regulation, industry par-
ticipants, as narrow self-interest maximizers, will adopt envi-
ronmentally harmful practices as long as it is cost-effective 
from their own narrow perspective. This reality bars the devel-
opment of environmentally friendly technologies.  
2. Tax and Trade Law 
Next consider the effect of fiscal laws and regulations. At 
first blush, tax law appears to be of little relevance to the pre-
sent discussion, yet differential tax treatment can be a major 
factor in determining the outcome of technological competition. 
This can be best seen in the case of greenhouse gas reducing 
technologies. There exists broad consensus among scholars that 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is a laudable social 
goal.53 One would expect, therefore, to see government policies 
that discourage greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, a careful exam-
ination reveals a host of policies that have had the opposite ef-
fect. For example, a tax break, popularly known as the “Hum-
mer Loophole,” for businesses purchasing light trucks—a 
category that included, inter alia, sport utility vehicles 
(SUVs)—was limited after public furor, only to be replaced with 
an even more generous 100 percent bonus depreciation for ve-
hicles weighing more than 14,000 pounds.54 Light trucks and 
SUVs consume large amounts of conventional fuels that lead to 
greenhouse gas emissions. In light of this fact, one would have 
expected to see higher taxes levied on this category of vehicles. 
In reality, though, the opposite transpired. As a result, alterna-
tive energy sources that were friendlier to the environment 
were placed at a disadvantage. Moreover, government funding 
of research on the production of liquid fuels petroleum can erect 
“barriers to low-carbon alternative fuels.”55 
Another way in which tax law impedes adoption of green 
technologies has to do with the rules pertaining to the deprecia-
 
 52. See Hannah Wiseman & Francis Gradijan, Regulation of Shale Gas 
Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing 4–6 (Univ. of Tulsa Legal Stud-
ies, Research Paper No. 2011-11, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953547. 
 53. See Brown & Chandler, supra note 15, at 472–73. 
 54. Janet Novack, How To Take a 100% Tax Write-Off for a New Porsche, 
BMW or Cadillac, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2011, 7:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/janetnovack/2011/04/08/how-to-take-a-tax-write-off-for-a-new-porsche 
-bmw-or-cadillac. 
 55. Brown & Chandler, supra note 15, at 476. 
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tion of capital investments and the expensing of energy-related 
costs. As Marilyn Brown and Sharon Chandler point out, “[i]n 
American industry, the current federal tax code discourages 
capital investments in general, as opposed to direct expensing 
of energy costs.”56 Specifically, the code sets long depreciation 
periods, say fifteen years, for energy efficient products, while 
providing for much shorter periods of only a few years for ex-
pensing energy-related costs.57 Consequently, businesses are 
disincentivized from investing in energy efficient plants and 
buildings that are not considered “direct” energy expenses un-
der the tax code.58 The divergent depreciation schedules for var-
ious investments “lock in” incumbent technologies59 and, thus, 
retard the rate and distort the path of technological substitu-
tion.60  
Trade policies may also impact technological choice. The 
case of ethanol is an illuminating example. It is commonly be-
lieved that biofuels such as ethanol are environmentally friend-
lier than petroleum fuels.61 Yet, in the United States, ethanol is 
subject to an import tariff.62 Like all other trade barriers, the 
tariff on importation of ethanol makes it more expensive rela-
tive to domestic alternatives, which, in turn, favors domestic 
fuel producers while harming consumers. The tariff was adopt-
ed by Congress to ensure energy independence. But this com-
mendable motivation does not change the effect of the tariff: it 
makes the purchase of ethanol from cheap foreign sources like 
Brazil less attractive for American industries. To make matters 
 
 56. Id.  
 57. 26 U.S.C. § 168 (2012).  
 58. For example, in one study that was conducted in 1996, Jenkins, 
Chapman, and Reilly concluded that on account of differential tax treatment, 
businesses would be better in terms of the tax implications investing in natu-
ral gas-operated plants than in plants using renewable energy sources. ALEC 
JENKINS, RICHARD CHAPMAN & HUGH REILLY, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, TAX 
BARRIERS TO FOUR RENEWABLE ELECTRIC GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES 
(1996), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/papers/CEC-999-1996-003. It 
should be noted that in light of legal amendments that have been passed after 
the study was conducted, it is not clear that its result remains valid. 
 59. See Gregory C. Unruh, Escaping Carbon Lock-In, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 
317, 318 (2002) (discussing institutional sources of lock-in fossil fuel-based 
systems). 
 60. Robin Cowan, Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-
In, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 541, 543–44 (1990) (explaining how markets can get 
locked into inferior technologies in early use). 
 61. Ethanol Facts: Environment, RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, http://www 
.ethanolrfa.org/pages/ethanol-facts-environment (last updated Mar. 2014).  
 62. See Brown & Chandler, supra note 15, at 481. 
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worse, the United States adopted a policy under which a larger 
subsidy is provided by the government to domestic gasoline 
blenders than to domestic ethanol manufacturers.63 Together 
these policies have the effect of lowering the use of ethanol in 
the United States compared to what it could be in their ab-
sence. 
3. Tort Liability 
The design of our tort system presents yet another legal 
obstacle to innovative green technologies. As Alex Stein togeth-
er with one of us pointed out, our tort law displays a strong bias 
in favor of customary technologies and, consequently, discour-
ages innovation.64 To see why, it is imperative to revisit the 
principles by which liability is assigned under our tort system. 
Not all activities that result in harm give rise to liability; liabil-
ity attaches only in those cases in which it is determined that 
the harm-causing activity fails to meet the “socially acceptable” 
standard.65 What is “socially acceptable,” in turn, is largely in-
formed by custom. In other words, courts routinely appeal to 
custom in deciding whether a defendant was negligent.66  
The centrality of custom in our torts system can be best 
seen in the context of negligence determinations, where by and 
large courts tend to equate defendants’ non-compliance with 
relevant industry customs to negligence.67 Specifically, courts 
generally presume that a defendant who failed to comply with 
safety-related customs prevalent in her industry acted negli-
gently.68 As the Restatement states: “In determining whether 
 
 63. Id.  
 64. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 285, 286 (2008) (demonstrating the anti-innovation bias of tort law). 
 65. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 12–13 (2000) (describing 
tort liability as premised on deviation from acceptable standards); PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 6 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th 
ed. 1984) (same). 
 66. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 65, § 33, 
at 193; Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 
1147–49 (1942) (underscoring the centrality and utility of courts’ reliance on 
custom in determining negligence). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Path to 
The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1992) (criticizing modern courts’ tendency to place cost-
benefit analysis ahead of custom in ascribing liability in torts). 
 67. David G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Liti-
gation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1023–24 (2004). 
 68. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Tort Law Is State Law: Why Courts Should 
Distinguish State and Federal Law in Negligence-Per-Se Litigation, 60 AM. U. 
L. REV. 71, 88 n.99 (2010). 
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conduct is negligent, the customs of the community, or of others 
under like circumstances, are factors to be taken into account, 
but are not controlling where a reasonable man would not fol-
low them.”69 The defendant may, of course, attempt to rebut 
this presumption,70 but in many cases, as a practical matter, 
non-compliance with custom often dooms defendants.71 This is 
so because in the absence of proof to the contrary, judges are 
empowered to give a directed verdict on the issue of negli-
gence.72 
Similarly, custom plays a key role in product liability cas-
es.73 Here, too, courts use custom as a reference point in as-
sessing whether the defendant’s product design was safe. A 
manufacturer’s compliance with the relevant industrial custom 
is admissible as evidence tending to prove that its product was 
safe.74 Conversely, a manufacturer’s failure to conform to cus-
tom constitutes evidence suggesting the presence of a defect in 
its product.75 Hence, any deviation from industry customs runs 
the risk of a finding that the product was defective. These fac-
tors are outcome determinative both under the “risk-utility”76 
 
 69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A, at 62 (1965); see also FED. 
R. EVID. 406 (noting that customs and routine practices are admissible as evi-
dence to prove action was in conformity with those practices). 
 70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmts. b, c, at 62–63 (“If 
the actor does what others do under like circumstances, there is at least a pos-
sible inference that he is conforming to the community standard of reasonable 
conduct; and if he does not do what others do, there is a possible inference that 
he is not so conforming. . . . [W]here there is nothing in the situation or in 
common experience to lead to the contrary conclusion, this inference may be so 
strong as to call for a directed verdict, one way or the other, on the issue of 
negligence. . . . Any such custom is . . . not necessarily conclusive . . . . Customs 
which are entirely reasonable under the ordinary circumstances which give 
rise to them may become quite unreasonable in the light of a single fact in the 
particular case.”). 
 71. This practice has an obvious explanation: custom integrates the con-
ventional wisdom—a decisional shortcut which is both easy and sensible to 
apply without generating much controversy over the court’s decision. See 
DOBBS, supra note 65, § 164, at 395–96; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS, supra note 65, § 33, at 193–94. 
 72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. b, at 62–63. 
 73. See David G. Owen, Proof of Product Defect, 93 KY. L.J. 1, 5–10 (2004) 
(documenting massive use of industry customs as a benchmark for determin-
ing design defects in product liability actions). 
 74. Id. at 8–9.  
 75. Id. at 7. 
 76. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 5.7, at 303–04 (2005). 
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and “consumer expectation”77 tests that are used by the courts 
to decide product liability cases.  
The combined effect of these tort rules is to subsidize con-
ventional practices and technologies. At the same time, the cus-
tom rules expose innovators and adopters of new technologies 
to an increased risk of liability. The heavy reliance on custom 
and conventional technologies makes it more difficult for green 
innovation to succeed in the marketplace. The custom rules 
create a strong evidential association between any damage re-
sulting from the firm’s activities and its adoption of new tech-
nologies that break away from the conventional wisdom. Natu-
rally, innovators critically depend on the adoption of their novel 
products and processes by market actors. Failure in the mar-
ketplace means that considerable resources expended on re-
search and development will be lost. The fact that innovative 
technologies expose adopters to a heightened risk of legal liabil-
ity serves as a disincentive to choose green technologies over 
conventional ones. This means that when a green technology is 
not better than a conventional rival by a margin that is large 
enough to offset the heighted risk, it will not be adopted.78 As a 
consequence, many green technologies will either be produced 
and fail in the marketplace or not be produced at all.79 
A case in point is green construction. Fear of liability de-
layed the adoption of green construction techniques.80 Of par-
ticular concern was the implied warranty of quality that ap-
plies to construction of new units.81 Initially, there existed 
significant “uncertainty over whether the construction quality 
of newly constructed green homes will be measured on the 
same standards as conventionally constructed homes or (more 
likely) a much higher standard which incorporates the expecta-
 
 77. Id. § 5.6, at 295. 
 78. We do not argue, of course, that green technologies will never be pro-
duced or adopted. Such an argument evidently fails. Our claim is different. We 
argue that in all those cases in which the green innovation does not offer po-
tential adopters benefits or cost savings that are significant enough to offset 
the legal risk differential, it will not succeed in the real world, or, worse, not 
be produced at all.  
 79. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 64, at 287–89; see also Porter 
& van der Linde, supra note 17 (discussing innovation offsets related to envi-
ronmental regulations).  
 80. See Jeffrey D. Masters & John R. Musitano Jr., Managing Liability 
Risks in Green Construction, 30 L.A. LAW. 17, 17 (2007). 
 81. See Hirokawa, supra note 35, at 521 n.100, 523 (discussing the im-
plied warranty of quality).  
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tions attendant to ‘high performance’ homes.”82 Similar is the 
story with innovative water technologies that could completely 
do away with the use of the air pollutant perchloroethylene, the 
main solvent used by the dry cleaning industry. Adoption of 
cleaner technologies has faced setbacks due to “dry clean only” 
consumer labelling standards that pre-date current technolo-
gies and end up imposing a risk of liability on cleaners that use 
innovative water technologies.83  
In addition to impeding adoption of green technologies, the 
custom rules distort the direction of technological progress. The 
heightened risk of liability for tort damages induces innovators 
to confine their inventive endeavors to the conventional techno-
logical frameworks, instead of focusing upon inventions that 
can lead to genuine environmental breakthroughs. The dynam-
ic efficiency loss occasioned by the custom rules may be far 
greater than it seems. By preventing certain inventions from 
ever being produced, the custom rules deprive society not only 
of those particular inventions but also of many subsequent in-
novations. This is especially true in cumulative innovation set-
tings, in which new inventions rely on preexisting ones.84 
B. ECONOMIC BARRIERS 
Legal barriers aside, green technologies may be passed up 
on account of pure economic, or business, considerations. Let it 
be clear that we do not suggest that firms shun green technolo-
gies on principle, out of pure animosity. On the contrary, we be-
lieve that, in principle, corporations are bottom-line oriented 
organizations. Accordingly, their tendency would be to adopt 
any innovation that can increase their profits. Yet, green inno-
vation often displays certain characteristics that may repel 
conventional firms. Specifically, green innovation often imposes 
high switching costs on adopters, so it is perceived as riskier 
than conventional alternatives and it is considered “disruptive” 
of established business models.85 In the proceeding paragraphs, 
we will elaborate on each of these effects.  
 
 82. Id. at 523. 
 83. ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 43, at 2–4.  
 84. On cumulative innovation, see generally Howard F. Chang, Patent 
Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 THE RAND J. ECON. 
34, 36 (1995) (providing an example of the cumulative innovation paradigm as 
applied to Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537 (1898)).  
 85. We do not argue that these characteristics (or problems) are unique to 
green innovation. They may be displayed by non-green or conventional innova-
tion as well. However, green innovation creates unique beneficial effects to our 
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1. Switching Costs, Decision Horizons, and Path Dependency 
Recent studies in economics demonstrate that even rela-
tively small switching costs may create strong lock-in effects.86 
For example, studies have shown that the need to incur a rela-
tively minor cost of 150 to 240 dollars in order to switch from 
one cellular phone provider to another may cause users to stick 
with their current provider,87 notwithstanding the fact that 
changing providers could have yielded them considerable long-
term benefits.88  
In short, the presence of switching cost may doom efficient 
changes. In the case of green technologies the problem is exac-
erbated by the fact that the cost of switching from a conven-
tional technology to a greener one may be quite substantial. As 
a result, even CEOs of companies who harbor an ideological 
preference for green technologies may elect not to use them.  
To comprehend the potential magnitude of this problem, 
imagine a power plant that operates on coal or fossil fuels and 
considers switching to a cleaner source of energy, say, bio-fuels. 
Changing the underlying production technology would require 
the proprietor to overhaul its plant. The one-time investment 
necessary to affect the change may very well stop the initiative 
dead in its tracks, even though it may very well prove itself to 
be cost-justifiable in the long run. Indeed, this problem may 
well explain the persistence of coal-operated power plants in 
the real world.89 Hence, in the absence of legal or financial in-
 
society and consequently society should be more concerned with barriers to the 
adoption of green innovation.  
 86. NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., SWITCH-
ING COSTS: PART ONE: ECONOMIC MODELS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 10, 25, 
31 (2003), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/ 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft655.pdf.  
 87. Patrick Xavier & Dimitri Ypsilanti, Switching Costs and Consumer 
Behaviour: Implications for Telecommunications Regulation, 10 INFO 25 (2008) 
(discussing the extent to which telecommunication users switch and why); see 
also Juan Pablo Maicas et al., Reducing the Level of Switching Costs in Mobile 
Communications: The Case of Mobile Number Portability, 33 TELECOMM. 
POL’Y 544 (2009) (explaining the effect of regulation on switching costs for mo-
bile phone users); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 86, at 10–11; 
Damon Darlin, The High Cost of Loving Your Phone, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/technology/13every.html (describ-
ing switching costs for mobile phone users).  
 88. NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 86, at 10. 
 89. For a report on existing and planned coal-based power plants, see The 
Ctr. for Media & Democracy, Existing U.S. Coal Plants, SOURCEWATCH (June 
1, 2012), http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Existing_U.S._Coal_ 
Plants. Also, for a report on new coal-based power plants under development, 
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centive to switch to greener production, companies will often 
prefer to stick with the status quo ante and live (and die) with 
the technology they have been using for years.  
The switching cost effect is compounded by the decision ho-
rizons problem that inflicts corporate thinking. The private 
(and social) benefits of green technologies are often spread out 
over long periods of time. For example, the switch to a cleaner 
production technology may yield moderate cost savings every 
year. In the long haul, these amounts may dramatically in-
crease the profits of the adopting corporation. But herein lies 
the rub. CEOs and corporate management typically do not have 
the same horizon as the shareholders—let alone the rest of our 
society. Corporations are run by agents seeking to maximize 
their own self-interest, not that of our society at large. This fact 
has two important implications for the present analysis. First, 
corporate decision making will not take into account environ-
mental benefits that do not contribute to the firm’s bottom-line. 
Second, corporate management will tend to favor short-term 
performance over long-term performance.  
The former point is well known; the latter requires elabo-
ration. In the era of performance-based remuneration,90 the 
management of corporations will strive to maximize short-term 
profits.91 Under the prevailing compensation paradigm, the bet-
ter the short-term performance, the higher the rewards for 
management. The long-term fate of the enterprise is of little in-
terest to the presiding management. This means that the man-
agement would be very averse to sacrifice short-term profits for 
long-term success. Society’s perspective is very different, of 
course. Society’s planning horizon is much longer than that of 
the management and its interests are more varied. From a so-
cietal perspective, investments that yield long-term benefits 
should be made by corporations. But society does not get to de-
cide. Hence, some form of intervention that more closely aligns 
 
see ERIK SHUSTER, DEP’T OF ENERGY, TRACKING NEW COAL-FIRED POWER 
PLANTS (2011), http://www.netl.doe.gov/coal/refshelf/ncp.pdf. 
 90. Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, Relative Performance Evalua-
tion Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium, 115 ECON. J. 1077, 1077 (2005).   
 91. See John M. Abowd, Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensa-
tion Affect Corporate Performance?, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 52 (1990) (an-
alyzing corporate performance and compensation under a performance-based 
remuneration model); see also Rajiv D. Banker et al., A Field-Study of the Im-
pact of a Performance-Based Incentive Plan, 21 J. ACCT. & ECON. 195 (1996) 
(describing a comprehensive management accounting field study of a perfor-
mance-based compensation plan in the retail arena, and its positive corporate 
results).    
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the private interest of management with that of the rest of so-
ciety is desirable in this context.  
Finally, transition to a newer, greener technology is severe-
ly curtailed even when the switching costs or decision horizons 
effect is minimal, because of the “path-dependent, co-
evolutionary” processes through which conventional energy so-
lutions have found entrenchment.92 Large technological systems 
such as electricity generation, distribution, and end use have to 
be visualized as part of a techno-institutional complex (TIC), 
embedded in a social and institutional setting comprising of 
other public and private actors, rather than as “discrete techno-
logical artifacts.”93 The initial adoption of a certain technology 
and its continued application are not so much the product of an 
optimization decision by rational economic actors as much as 
the outcome of “a path-dependent process in which timing, 
strategy and historic circumstance, as much as optimality, de-
termine the winner.”94 Once a dominant design survives in the 
market, firms focus on incremental innovation that locks them 
into this design and shy away from alternatives that render the 
design obsolete.95  
The more impactful lock-in, though, is at the institutional 
level, because of positive network externalities that make the 
technology more valuable to users. When there is higher inter-
industry dependence on a technology, it is normally reinforced 
by private commercial institutions that finance the operational-
ization of such technology, and by educational institutions that 
disseminate knowledge pertaining to the same. Soon, institu-
tional standards and conventions develop around the technolo-
gy, in order to reduce or eliminate uncertainties that can ham-
per its further growth.96 Unions and industry associations 
emerge to represent workers employed in its production.97 Even 
media opinion and social behavior co-evolve with the technolo-
gy.98 Finally, all this momentum leads to formal recognition of 
the technology by governmental institutions. The last phase is 
particularly locking-in in its effects because it has the potential 
 
 92. Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 
817, 818 (2000).  
 93. Id.   
 94. Id. at 820. 
 95. For detailed discussion, see infra Part I.B.3. 
 96. Unruh, supra note 92, at 822.  
 97. Id. at 823–24. 
 98. Id. at 824. 
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to “override market forces,” and survive in its initial form “for 
extended periods” due to the delays and uncertainties inherent 
in the political process.99 In short, the technology, over time, 
pervades the larger economic, social, and political system, thus 
gradually but totally resulting in institutional lock-ins. Energy 
markets are especially prone to technology lock-in because of 
the perfect substitutability of the end product, electricity, from 
different technologies. This also prevents new, cleaner technol-
ogies from internalizing the value of future learning into the 
product price.100  
2. Risk Aversion and First Mover Disadvantage 
Another significant obstacle to the adoption of green tech-
nologies is risk aversion. This factor especially pertains to 
green technologies that deviate from established patterns. The 
more path-breaking a technology is the higher the risk that 
may be associated with it. And, the higher the risk, the higher 
needs to be the expected reward for the technology to be adopt-
ed.101 Concern with risk is a paramount aspect of the business 
world.102 Yet, it puts new technologies (both green and brown) 
at an inherent disadvantage relative to technologies that have 
been used for extended periods of time and improvements on 
such technologies.103 Simply put, firms possess much better in-
formation on the performance of conventional technology.  
One should not underestimate the risk presented for corpo-
rations by new technologies. Technological changes run the risk 
of various malfunctions. The risk may be big or small, but in 
the absence of real world experience with the technology it may 
be very difficult to know. As a result, each firm would rather 
have another company adopt the technology first. However, 
 
 99. Id. at 824–25. 
 100. Matthias Kalkuhl et al., Learning or Lock-In: Optimal Technology 
Policies To Support Mitigation, 34 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 1, 10 (2012). 
 101. George S. Day & Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Innovating in Uncertain 
Markets: 10 Lessons for Green Technologies, 52 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 37 
(2011), available at http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/innovating-in-uncertain 
-markets-10-lessons-for-green-technologies. 
 102. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF 
RISK 1–8, 192–93, 246 (1998); see also Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk 
Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644 (2002) (describing the 
risk aversion business paradigm and the incentives that make it shift).  
 103. Kenneth Gillingham & James Sweeney, Market Failure and the Struc-
ture of Externalities, in HARNESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY 69, 74–75 (A. Jorge 
Padilla & Richard Schmalensee eds., 2010), available at http://www.yale.edu/ 
gillingham/GillinghamSweeney_MktFailureStructureExternalities_proof.pdf. 
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since all firms share the same preference vis-à-vis one another, 
the technology may not be adopted at all.104  
The problem may also be stated in a slightly different way: 
adoption of new technologies frequently creates a first mover 
disadvantage. The first adopter of a new technology absorbs the 
risk of failure for all other market participants. The first mover 
will have to deal with the cost of addressing the problems that 
arise over time, especially in the early stages, while its rivals 
can follow from afar and assess the new technology. The first 
mover disadvantage is very small when the technology at issue 
is an improvement of a preexisting technology. But it is very 
significant when the new technology at issue departs from the 
accepted paradigm, as many green technologies do.105 The first 
mover disadvantage problem is especially acute when imple-
mentation of a green technology requires significant invest-
ment in infrastructure as is often the case in the transportation 
sector.106 
3. Disruption of Accepted Business Models 
In his important book, The Innovator’s Dilemma, Clayton 
Christensen explained how disruptive technologies can be the 
bane of successful, established corporations.107 Disruptive tech-
nologies are cheaper than established technologies. In the 
beginning, they offer a lower performance alternative to the 
 
 104. ADAM B. JAFFE ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, A TALE OF TWO MARKET 
FAILURES: TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.rff.org/documents/rff-dp-04-38.pdf. 
 105. Id. at 7. 
 106. The shift to cleaner or smarter transportation necessitates massive 
investment in infrastructure, such as charging construction of advanced rail-
roads or provision of new energy sources. In this case, the government must 
step in and provide the infrastructure as it does with other public goods. See 
CHARLES WHEELAN, NAKED ECONOMICS: UNDRESSING THE DISMAL SCIENCE 
54–103 (2002); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technolo-
gy and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 169, 172–73 (2005); 
Alan Williams, The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local 
Government, 74 J. POL. ECON. 18 (1966). Alternatively, a private company can 
step in and provide the necessary infrastructure. In fact, this is exactly what 
Google did in the case of smart cars. Google harnessed its “Street View” func-
tionality to enable the operation of driverless cars that are supposed to reduce 
the pollution associated with private transportation. John Markoff, Google 
Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html. For a broader discussion of the 
topic, see Theodore Bergstrom et al., On the Private Provision of Public Goods, 
29 J. PUB. ECON. 25 (1986), and R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 
J.L. & ECON. 357, 358–59, 375–76 (1974).  
 107. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 11, at xxiii, 117–38, 264.  
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dominant technology and thus do not appeal to high margin 
consumers.108 Over time, though, disruptive technologies 
improve rapidly without a marked cost increase and ultimately 
they outperform and supersede established technologies.109 
Digital photography is perhaps the best example of a disruptive 
technology.110  
Perversely, dominant firms are especially vulnerable to the 
emergence of disruptive technologies since they are deeply 
invested in the established technology and their entire business 
model is predicated on it. This happens in sequential stages. 
Scale economies result in significant ‘sunk costs’ in the 
dominant design, and this is soon followed by learning effects 
or “learning by doing” that leads to improvisation and 
innovation in the production process.111 With increased 
adoption of the design, adaptive expectations arise because of 
reduced uncertainty in the design. Worse yet, initially the 
disruptive technology has little “market pull” and, hence, 
dominant firms are reluctant to switch for fear of losing their 
clientele.112 Kodak-Easterman’s handling—or more accurately, 
mishandling—of digital photography provides a sad, yet 
powerful example of the approach of established corporations to 
disruptive innovation.113  
While not all green technologies fall into the category of 
disruptive innovation, many of them do. Green innovation often 
challenges accepted production paradigms and long-standing 
profit models.114 After all, it is the very essence of green 
 
 108. Id. at xvii.  
 109. Erwin Danneels, Disruptive Technology Reconsidered: A Critique and 
Research Agenda, 21 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 246, 247 (2004).  
 110. David W. Cravens et al., The Innovation Challenges of Proactive Can-
nibalisation and Discontinuous Technologies, 14 EUR. BUS. REV. 257, 260 
(2002).  
 111. STEVEN D. LEVITT ET AL., TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF LEARNING 
BY DOING: EVIDENCE FROM AN AUTOMOBILE ASSEMBLY PLANT 1 (2013), avail-
able at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/chad.syverson/research/learningbydoing 
.pdf. 
 112. Timothy J. Foxon, Technological Lock-In and the Role of Innovation, 
in HANDBOOK OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 140, 142 (Giles Atkinson et al. 
eds., 2007). 
 113. Henry C. Lucas Jr. & Jie Mein Goh, Disruptive Technology: How Ko-
dak Missed the Digital Photography Revolution, 18 J. STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 46 
(2009).  
 114. See Matt Rogers, Energy = Innovation: 10 Disruptive Technologies, 
MCKINSEY ON SUSTAINABILITY & RESOURCE PRODUCTIVITY (2012), http://www 
.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/ 
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technologies to offer cleaner, environmentally friendlier 
products and processes that often represent a paradigm shift 
relative to the predominant technology.115 Consequently, 
established corporations may initially ignore green inventions 
and subsequently, as they gain a foothold in the market, even 
fight them. The attitude of the American automobile industry 
to electric cars is a case in point. The idea of an electric car has 
been floating around for years.116 Yet, it took car manufacturers 
several decades to warm up to it.117 Auto manufacturers whose 
profit model in the last decades heavily relied on powerful, 
albeit fuel-inefficient vehicles refused to buy into the concept of 
electricity-operated cars.118 The fact that electric cars were 
slower than fuel-operated cars did not help matters.119 It took a 
massive increase in gas prices and global economic crisis to 
cause the United States car industry to reconsider its approach 
to electric cars, and even so, it will probably take a few more 
decades until such cars become the standard.120 
 
sustainability/pdfs/mck%20on%20srp/srp_02_innovation.ashx (describing con-
temporary disruptive technologies in the environmental field). 
 115. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 85 
(3d ed. 1996).  
 116. Electric vehicles were actually the dominant form of motor vehicles in 
America during the mid to late nineteenth century. DAVID A. KIRSCH, THE 
ELECTRIC VEHICLE AND THE BURDEN OF HISTORY 37–41 (2000). After electric 
vehicles fell out of favor due to the development of the internal combustion en-
gine, multiple oil crises and environmental concerns in the 1970s pushed al-
ternative fuel vehicles into the public consciousness. This led to a revival in 
interest in electric cars during the second half of the twentieth century. Id. at 
204.  
 117. Id. at 203–08. 
 118. Id.; see also Adam Hartung, Why Tesla Is Beating GM, Ford and Toyo-
ta – Electric Cars, FORBES (July 11, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
adamhartung/2012/07/11/why-tesla-is-beating-gm-ford-and-toyota-at-electric 
-cars (detailing how auto manufacturers are reluctant even today to truly 
adopt the electric car). 
 119. For electric vehicles to sustain high speeds past twenty miles per 
hour, the battery must be able to meet the rapidly increasing electric power 
requirements. KIRSCH, supra note 116, at 106–07. Thus, it required the devel-
opment of better batteries for electric cars to compete with the top speeds from 
gas powered vehicles. During the early 1970s, it was theorized that a mass-
produced electric car would have a range of fifty miles at a speed of fifty miles 
per hour. John O’M. Bockris, The Case for Electric and Fuel-Cell Powered Ve-
hicles, 3 AMBIO 15, 21 (1974).  
 120. See Brad Plumer, As Battery Prices Drop, Will Electric Cars Finally 
Catch On?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (July 12, 2012), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/12/as-battery-prices-drop 
-will-electric-cars-finally-catch-on (suggesting that because the price competi-
tiveness of electric cars is tied to the cost of batteries, it will take some time 
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The challenge green technologies present for established 
corporations is compounded by the “not our idea” mentality.121 
Research in behavioral psychology shows that individuals and 
corporations tend to over-evaluate their own ideas and under-
estimate the ideas of other people.122 Accordingly, corporations 
that developed the technology that currently holds sway on the 
market, or even licensed it, may be especially reluctant to give 
green technologies a try, especially if they were not developed 
in-house.123 Thus, a chemical plant may steadfastly adhere to 
environmentally harmful manufacturing processes that it has 
used for a year, refusing to consider greener alternatives.  
Having reviewed the various legal and business obstacles 
green companies face, in the next Part we proceed to introduce 
a new mechanism that may alleviate many of the roadblocks 
we discussed and give green technologies a better chance of 
making it in the marketplace.  
II.  WHAT CAN BROWN DO FOR YOU?   
All else being equal, from a societal vantage point, envi-
ronmentally friendly technology should be preferred to envi-
ronmentally harmful, or even environmentally neutral, tech-
nologies.124 And in a world with an omniscient beneficent social 
planner the correct technological choice would be made. In real-
ity, however, technological choices are not made by a central 
planner. Rather, they are largely left to the market, or more ac-
curately, to the firms operating in it.  
The technology choices of private firms are likely to diverge 
from the socially optimal choice. The cost-benefit analysis per-
formed by a firm is different from that of society at large. As 
profit-maximizing entities, firms will likely adopt production 
 
before electric cars will be able to compete against regular internal combustion 
engine vehicles). 
 121. DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF IRRATIONALITY: THE UNEXPECTED BENE-
FITS OF DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND AT HOME 107–22 (2010) (discussing the 
phenomenon of actors overvaluing their own ideas and creations).  
 122. Id.  
 123. See Bryan Kent Bollinger, Green Technology Adoption in Response To 
Environmental Policies 1 (June 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stan-
ford University), available at 
https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:kw873vh9740/Green%20Technology% 
20Adoption-augmented.pdf. 
 124. See Jonathan M.W.W. Chu, Developing and Diffusing Green Technolo-
gies: The Impact of Intellectual Property Rights and Their Justification, 4 
WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV’T 53, 60–62 (2013).  
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technology that guarantees them the highest possible expected 
net payoff, even when the choice is socially suboptimal. Moreo-
ver, firms will adopt profit-maximizing strategies even when 
those strategies impose costs on society at large.125 Indeed, the 
indifference toward social costs gave birth to the law and eco-
nomics movement. Left to their own devices, profit maximizing 
firms will not take account of environmental harms as long as 
those harms do not negatively affect their profits. This misa-
lignment between the private calculus performed by firms and 
that of society at large is the standard justification for legal in-
tervention in the marketplace.126 
Generally speaking, legal intervention can take the form of 
a stick or carrot.127 The paradigmatic example of the former is 
regulation. Regulation tends to be negative in nature. It pro-
scribes actors from taking certain action under the threat of le-
gal punishment.128 Private litigation is another form of a 
“stick.”129 The norms of private law make certain deviations 
from socially desirable standards actionable and entrust pri-
vate litigants and courts with the task of disciplining viola-
 
 125. See James Halteman, Externalities and the Coase Theorem: A Dia-
grammatic Presentation, 36 J. ECON. EDUC. 385, 385 (2005); see also WILLIAM 
J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 75–79 (1979) (noting that “the price system does not act 
as an efficient servant of the public’s preferences” when there are significant 
externalities). 
 126. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 125, at 230–32; PIGOU, supra note 
42, at 134; cf. Coase, supra note 14, at 15 (arguing that if there are no transac-
tion costs, legal interventions into the marketplace may not be necessary to fix 
this misalignment because the relevant parties would always bargain with one 
another to reach the socially optimal level of environmental harms). 
 127. See generally James Andreoni et al., The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, 
Punishments, and Cooperation, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 893 (2003) (examining 
punishments and rewards in economic laboratory experiments).  
 128. See Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Envi-
ronmental Behavior, 27 LAW & POL’Y 262, 262 (2005) (explaining how regula-
tory programs depend on formal prosecutions and legal sanctions against vio-
lators to create a deterrence threat); see also Andrew Green, You Can’t Pay 
Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social Norms, 30 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 424 (2006) (describing government regulations as 
“sticks”). 
 129. See Stefanie Fleischer Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on Behalf of 
Women Offenders, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 21 (1995) (“[L]itigation is a 
good ‘stick.’”); see also Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punish-
ment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000) (providing 
evidence based on experimental data that there is a widespread willingness to 
punish those that free ride and abuse social norms).  
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tors.130 Alternatively, society may use “carrots” to induce actors 
to behave in socially desirable ways. An oft-cited example of a 
“carrot” is a subsidy.131 A subsidy consists of a direct or indirect 
transfer of money from the public fisc to a private actor to re-
ward a certain behavior. Tax breaks132 and prizes133 may be 
used to the same effect.  
In the paragraphs to come, we present a novel mecha-
nism—the green option—that falls outside the conventional 
tools used by lawmakers to channel the behavior of market ac-
tors. Our mechanism is uniquely designed to harness the profit 
motivation of firms to facilitate the success of green companies. 
Moreover, the implementation of our mechanism requires a 
fairly minimal intervention in the operation of markets and no 
ongoing monitoring.  
A. THE GREEN OPTION 
The discussion in Part I demonstrated that green technolo-
gies face a myriad of legal and market barriers. Although we 
clearly do not suggest that established firms are directly re-
sponsible for erecting these barriers, it is clear that such firms 
can facilitate the introduction of green technologies and con-
tribute to their success in the marketplace. Indeed, small com-
panies that produce environmentally friendly inventions can 
dramatically benefit from partnering up with larger, more es-
tablished firms.134 The advantages that strategic business part-
ners offer to small, startup firms are real and significant and 
can be the difference between success and failure.  
 
 130. See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012).  
 131. See Harry Moren, Note, The Difficulty of Fencing In Interstate Emis-
sions: EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule Fails To Make Good Neighbors, 36 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 525, 542 (2009) (“[A] government subsidy is a carrot.”); see also 
Green, supra note 128, at 424 (describing government subsidies as “carrots”).  
 132. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3531.10.1, at 7 (Supp. 2014) (“A tax ‘break’ often is economically and 
functionally indistinguishable from a direct payment. Among the examples 
was this: a state that wishes to subsidize the ownership of crucifixes could buy 
and distribute them, or reimburse private purchases, or give a tax credit for 
the purchase price.”).  
 133. For discussion on the use of prizes to induce innovation, see Steven 
Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 
44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001).  
 134. See, e.g., TERESA GORBETT ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE BUSINESS RA-
TIONALE BEHIND THE TREND TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY MANU-
FACTURING PRACTICES 16–17 (2005), available at https://www.wm.edu/as/ 
publicpolicy/documents/prs/green.pdf. 
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Naturally, in light of the difference in market positions, 
there exists a large disparity in the bargaining power between 
established and startup firms. As a result, it is the large estab-
lished corporations that get to decide whether to give a chance 
to green technologies, and if so, under what conditions. Under 
the extant regime, large corporations are under no obligation to 
endorse environmental innovations, and green companies can 
do little besides hope that their products offer cost savings suf-
ficient enough to attract the attention of their larger peers. So-
ciety at large currently plays no part in this dynamic, despite 
its unequivocal interest in promoting environmentally friendly 
products and processes.135  
Yet society need not stay on the sidelines and hope that the 
market will yield socially desirable outcomes, especially when 
so much is at stake and the market is imperfect. A simple 
change in the law can go a long way toward transforming the 
current reality and give green innovation a much better chance 
at market success. Specifically, we propose that green compa-
nies will be granted the power to transfer a call option for five 
percent of their shares to an established company of their 
choice. For the purpose of our proposal, any publically traded 
company will be considered an established company. The option 
will be granted to the established company for free and its ex-
ercise price will be set to equal the value of the green compa-
ny’s share at the time of the transfer. It will be open for a peri-
od of five years. However, unlike the case with standard call 
options, the receiving company will not be able to simply allow 
the call option to expire at the end of the five-year period. Ra-
ther, it will be forced to exercise the option at that time. We call 
this policy tool “the green option.”  
A numerical example can illustrate how the green option 
would work. Assume that on August 1, 2012, ClearTech Inc. 
wishes to take advantage of the green option by transferring a 
call option for five percent of the company—or 1,000,000 
shares—to BrownWater Co. At the time of the transfer, the 
value of each of ClearTech’s shares was estimated at $2. The 
transfer of the option will not expose BrownWater to an imme-
diate financial liability. BrownWater receives the option for 
free. It will only have to pay the exercise price—in our case, $2 
per share—when it decides to exercise the option. For simplici-
ty’s sake, we will assume that BrownWater chooses to wait the 
 
 135. See Marilyn A. Brown, Market Failures and Barriers As a Basis for 
Clean Energy Policies, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 1197, 1201 (2001). 
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full five years and exercises the option on August 1, 2017. At 
this moment, it will have to pay $2 million ($2 x 1,000,000) to 
GreenTech. If the value of GreenTech quadrupled between 
2012 and 2017, such that each share is now worth $8, then 
BrownWater will have netted $6 million.136 If, by contrast, the 
value of each of GreenTech’s shares dropped to $1 by the exer-
cise date, then BrownWater will lose $1 million.137  
The proposed mechanism creates a partial alignment be-
tween the interests of established and green technology compa-
nies. Its point and purpose is to give established companies a 
financial stake in green technology and then harness their prof-
it motive to promote the technologies in which they are invest-
ed. By empowering green companies to transfer an option on 
their stocks to established businesses, we will allow them to 
forge strategic partnerships with established corporations. 
Such strategic partnerships could be invaluable for green com-
panies.138 Indeed, they may well make the difference between 
success and failure in the marketplace.  
Having a financial stake in a green company will prompt 
established businesses to promote the environmental technolo-
gies offered by the smaller startup firm. And although the prof-
it (or loss) the established firm stands to gain (or lose) from the 
green venture may be small by comparison to other revenue 
streams it generates, we can make it significant enough so that 
it cannot be ignored even by successful large firms. It should be 
noted in this context that recent research in behavioral psy-
chology demonstrated that even relatively small financial in-
centives may have a profound effect on behavior and decision 
making.139 In line with this finding, we believe that by making 
established businesses stakeholders in green technologies, 
 
 136. It paid $2 million for shares whose current worth is $8 million. 
 137. In this case, it is paying $2 million for shares that are worth only half 
of this amount, namely $1 million. 
 138. For an in-depth analysis on how strategic partnerships can benefit 
small technology firms, see David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, 
Small-Firm Strategic Research Partnerships: The Case of Biotechnology, 15 
TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 273 (2003); Rachel Sheinbein, Why 
Cleantech Startups Need To Partner with Big Companies, FORBES (Sept. 26, 
2011, 4:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/09/26/why-big- 
companies-need-to-partner-with-cleantech-startups. 
 139. ARIELY, supra note 121, at 17–52 (discussing experiments that show 
that small incentives can lead to better performance than very large ones).  
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lawmakers can transform their attitude toward such technolo-
gies and turn them into agents of social change.140 
As far as green companies are concerned, our mechanism 
creates a win-win situation. Our proposal gives green compa-
nies complete discretion to decide whether to take advantage of 
the green option. From the vantage point of the green compa-
nies, the mechanism we propose is completely optional. Green 
companies can decide to use it or forego it, depending on their 
particular circumstances. A green company that prefers to “go 
it alone” or one that already has a strategic partner is at liberty 
not to use the mechanism. By contrast, a green company that 
can benefit from transferring a call option to an established 
business will have the unilateral power to do so. In effect, the 
green option adds another possibility to the menu of legal pow-
ers available to green companies,141 without taking anything 
away from that menu. Since there are significant differences 
among green firms in terms of their business models and fi-
nancing potential, we expect that some of them will take ad-
vantage of the new power we bestow upon them while others 
will not. In other words, green companies will self-select 
whether to use the new legal option and a separating equilibri-
um will result.142 
The same cannot be said about established firms. From the 
vantage point of established firms, the green option constitutes 
an imposition. It forces them to take an interest in an environ-
mental company or technology that they may not have invested 
in otherwise, or may have taken under more favorable terms. 
Hence, although our proposal creates a potential upside for the 
established firm, it is undeniable that the upside is accompa-
nied by a risk. In defense of our proposal, it must be said that 
we have come a long way from the laissez faire ideology that 
dominated political thought at the end of the nineteenth and 
 
 140. It should be added that the financial interest of the established busi-
nesses in the green companies will not necessarily terminate at the end of the 
option’s life. The established businesses will continue to have a stake in the 
green companies as long as they hold the stock. This interest will be terminat-
ed with the sale of the stock. This event, however, may take place many years 
into the future.  
 141. Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3 (2006) (defining 
menu as, “a contractual offer that empowers the offeree to accept more than 
one type of contract”). 
 142. That is, in equilibrium, not all companies will act alike; or in economic 
parlance, they will not pool together. 
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beginning of the twentieth century.143 Today, firms must comply 
with multiple laws and regulations that restrict their freedom 
of choice.144  
Nonetheless, in order to protect established firms from po-
tential opportunism on the part of green entrepreneurs, we in-
troduce two important limitations on the power of green com-
panies to use the green option. First, in order to reduce the risk 
to receiving firms, we propose that the green option will only be 
available to startups that have been in existence for at least 
five years and have commercialized their core green technology. 
The point and purpose of this limitation is to filter out the 
startups that carry the highest risk of failure, those in the first 
few years of their existence.145 In addition, we would make the 
green option available only to companies that produce the 
green technology they developed—or put differently, commer-
cialized. The commercialization requirement is important for 
two reasons: it reduces the risk to the receiving company, and it 
enhances the likelihood of a future benefit to society at large.146 
The commercialization requirement is important for another 
reason: commercialization signals seriousness and that the 
green investors are really committed to their venture. 
Second, we would exempt established firms that have al-
ready voluntarily partnered up with green companies or devel-
oped a similar green technology “in house” from taking the 
green option. These companies will, of course, be at liberty to 
make an additional investment in green companies should they 
 
 143. For a history of laissez faire, see HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE 
OF LAISSEZ FAIRE, 1897–1917 (1951); JACOB VINER, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLEC-
TUAL HISTORY OF ECONOMICS (Douglas A. Irwin ed., 1991).  
 144. For a discussion of the many ways that firms are regulated, see Colin 
Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory 
State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY RE-
FORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145, 160–66 (Jacint Jordana & David 
Levi-Faur eds., 2004). 
 145. For a discussion on the correlation between “years of existence” or 
“age” and the “likelihood of success” for startup companies, see Sue Birley, The 
Role of New Firms: Births, Deaths and Job Generation, 7 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 
361, 363–64, 368–69 (1986); Josef Brüderl & Rudolf Schüssler, Organizational 
Mortality: The Liabilities of Newness and Adolescence, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 530 
(1990).  
 146. Ted Sichelman explains in his article, Commercializing Patents, how 
commercializing an invention into a viable product is a costly and risky devel-
opment process. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
341, 343 (2010). Thus, it is logical to assume that once an invention has been 
transformed into a commercial product, the overall risk associated with that 
invention is reduced because it was able to overcome a significant hurdle.   
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choose to do so. But they will be under no legal obligation to ac-
cept the green option if it is offered to them. The point of our 
proposal is to get as many established companies as possible 
involved in the promotion of green technologies. Companies 
that chose to invest in green technologies on their own accord 
already bear their fair share of the burden. In addition, the 
proposed exemption has the salutary effect of incentivizing 
firms to actively search for the most promising green technolo-
gies and invest in them, rather than sit passively and wait un-
til an environmental startup forces them, under the terms of 
our scheme, to take a financial interest in it. 
B. TAKING STOCK 
The implementation of our proposal will yield several im-
portant benefits for green companies, as well as for society at 
large. We will conduct our analysis of these benefits from three 
different perspectives: a business perspective, a political per-
spective, and a societal perspective.  
1. The Business Perspective 
Forming a strategic allegiance with an established busi-
ness may dramatically increase the odds of success for green 
companies. Once a green company transfers an option on its 
shares to an established business in accordance with our pro-
posal, the receiving company will have an incentive to see the 
green company succeed. Moreover, since our scheme correlates 
the payoff to the established company to the success rate of the 
green company, it incentivizes established businesses that re-
ceive a green option to use their market position to promote the 
green technology in which they are invested.  
Established businesses can help green companies in sever-
al important ways. On the most basic level, they can provide 
economic advice and guidance. Drawing on their own experi-
ence, connections, and business acumen, large corporations can 
help startups avoid critical mistakes. They can also instruct as 
to how to allocate existing resources more efficiently and how to 
raise new funds. Receiving free advice will generate another 
benefit for green companies: it will enable them to save funds 
that they might have otherwise spent on buying consulting ser-
vices.  
Sharing information and knowledge is not the only means 
by which established businesses can help green companies. 
They can adopt the green technology at issue and use it in their 
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own operations. Doing so will obviously create revenues for the 
green company. Equally important, it will give the green com-
pany an invaluable opportunity to test the technology and to 
show that it works in the real world. Moreover, such a move 
will send a signal to the market about the quality of the green 
technology.147 The signaling aspect is especially important in 
this case since the established company is presumed to have 
superior information relative to the rest of the market owing to 
its special relationship with the green company and because 
the signal in this case is very costly for the established busi-
ness.148 
Finally, large corporations can help green startups gain 
foothold in the market by introducing them to their clients, fi-
nanciers, and other business partners. Establishing a new 
business relationship will be particularly easy if the established 
corporation chose to adopt the green technology in its opera-
tions. But even if the established corporation decided not to use 
the green technology, it should be able to open new doors for 
the green company for two principal reasons. First, under the 
terms of our proposal, the established company could turn 
down the offer of the green company and invest in an alterna-
tive green technology. The fact that it chose not to do so means 
that it sees real potential in the green company whose option it 
has taken. Second, after the option has been taken, the fates of 
the two corporations become intertwined. Failure by the green 
company may have adverse consequences for the established 
firm, as well as for its suppliers, clients, and business partners. 
As a result, all the businesses that work with the established 
firm have an indirect interest in the success of the green com-
pany.  
The benefit flow is not a one-way street, as even estab-
lished firms can immensely gain from collaboration with green 
companies and technologies. 
2. The Political Perspective 
Established businesses can also affect the legal and regula-
tory regimes that govern the different businesses. Public choice 
 
 147. See Amna Kirmani & Akshay R. Rao, No Pain, No Gain: A Critical 
Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality, 64 J. 
MARKETING 66, 66 (2000).  
 148. The incorporation of a new technology into a business requires a con-
siderable investment of resources. At times, it requires a complete overhaul of 
the business model.  
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theorists have long analogized the political arena to a market 
environment in which goods and services are bought and sold. 
The pioneering work of public choice theorists, such as Gordon 
Tullock,149 James Buchanan,150 Sam Peltzman,151 Gary Becker,152 
and Anne Krueger,153 famously suggested that government ser-
vices are sold by politicians to private bidders.154 Subsequent 
empirical studies validated the main predictions of the theo-
ry.155 Large industry participants can use their wealth to secure 
favorable legislation and regulation, or, conversely, to pass leg-
islation that adversely impacts their competitors.156 Successful 
firms, in other words, must establish a presence in the political 
arena.157 
Small startup firms do not share a similar ability to affect 
the political process for two main reasons. First, they don’t 
have the financial wherewithal to secure legislative and regula-
tory changes.158 Put in stark terms, small companies simply 
 
 149. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and 
Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 228 (1967). 
 150. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in 
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 8–11 (James M. Bu-
chanan et al. eds., 1980). 
 151. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 
19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211–13 (1976). 
 152. E.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups 
for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 392 (1983). 
 153. See, e.g., Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 302 (1974). 
 154. For discussion of the implications of public choice for environmental 
law and economics, see MICHAEL FAURE & GÖRAN SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 171–77, 203–05 (2003). 
 155. See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? 
Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S. ECON. J. 606, 615 (1991) 
(discussing how members and lobbyists of the sugar industry were able to ex-
tract legislative favors in exchange for donations). 
 156. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 
AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267–68 (1983) (stating that government regulations are 
prone to rent-seeking behavior as it would be in the best interests of the firms 
with lobbying power to raise competitors’ relative compliance costs). 
 157. See Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Sto-
ry, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1558 (2005) (observing that “firm competition takes 
place both in the marketplace and in the political arena; the dynamics of one 
environment affect the other”). 
 158. Just to get a sense of the amounts involved, the entertainment indus-
try spent $123 million on lobbying efforts in 2011. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 
TV/Movies/Music: Industry Profile 2011, OPENSECRETS, http://www 
.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=B02&year=2011 (last visited Dec. 
12, 2014). The Internet industry topped that amount with $127 million in 
spending. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Computers/Internet: Industry Profile 
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cannot afford the “price” politicians require for their services. 
Accordingly, many environmental startup firms have no voice 
in the political process. They must live and die by the laws and 
regulations designed by their larger, more established peers 
without any meaningful ability to stop them from being enacted 
or affecting their content.  
Second, as Jill Fisch demonstrated, a one-time political do-
nation cannot get a firm a say in the political process.159 Rather, 
firms gain political clout through multiple interactions with 
politicians that occur over an extended period of time.160 Corpo-
rations must establish bonding and trust with political actors 
before they can turn to them for help. This requirement puts 
new corporations at a serious disadvantage relative to more es-
tablished ones. Even if a new corporation decides to make a 
campaign contribution in an attempt to amend the prevailing 
regulatory regime it is unlikely to find a political actor who will 
be willing to play along.  
The political fortunes of a small corporation can dramati-
cally change if it can find a larger corporation to take it under 
its wing. In this case, the more established business could use 
its political and financial capital to watch out for the interests 
of the small firm and ensure that it gets adequate representa-
tion in the political arena. By effecting a partial financial 
alignment between the interests of green corporations and es-
tablished businesses, the implementation of our proposal will 
provide the latter a meaningful incentive to support environ-
mentally friendly regulation or, at the very least, not to oppose 
it.161  
One may wonder whether our proposal gives the estab-
lished business a sufficient monetary incentive to mobilize its 
political allies in favor of the relevant environmental cause. We 
can think of three responses to this concern. First, as we ex-
plained, in many cases all that is required from the established 
corporation is not to block (or effectively veto) pro-
 
2011, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php? 
id=B12&year=2011 (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). Google Inc. alone spent $9.7 
million toward this end. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Annual Lobbying by 
Google Inc., OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum 
.php?id=D000022008&year=2011 (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).  
 159. See Fisch, supra note 157, at 1559 (describing how established corpo-
rations foster relationships with politicians over extended periods of time in 
order to secure favorable (de)regulatory treatment). 
 160. Id. at 1559–60. 
 161. The same is suggested in ENDRES, supra note 6, at 200–02. 
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environmental regulation, and even a modest financial interest 
should suffice to achieve this result. Second, under the current 
political environment, there exists significant political goodwill 
to promote environmental causes. Consequently, the cost of 
mobilizing pro-environmental initiatives may be much lower 
than the cost of opposing them. Third, and most importantly, 
often the relevant level for intervention is the local level of gov-
ernment. Many of the regulatory standards that apply to con-
struction, transportation, and energy are set at the local lev-
el,162 and affecting political decision making on the local level is 
far less costly than attempting to influence lawmakers on the 
state or nationwide level.  
3. The Social Perspective 
As we explained, society has a clear interest in protecting 
the environment by avoiding unnecessary environmental harm. 
This social goal implies, at the very least, that legal policies 
that impede green innovation should be repealed in order to 
give green innovation a chance to compete on a level playing 
field. For the reasons we discussed, however, removing the le-
gal obstacles will fall short of achieving this objective on ac-
count of the business barriers to green products and technolo-
gies.163 
One could suggest at this point that the best way to level 
the playing field is to subsidize green technologies. After all, 
green technologies confer a benefit to the public and hence it 
makes sense for the public to fund them. We would caution 
against this superficially alluring solution. In fact, we contend 
that our proposal is clearly superior to subsidization. There are 
several problems with the subsidization solution. First, any 
subsidization scheme gives rise to a herculean information 
challenge. Even if all politicians were benign and well-meaning, 
which is clearly not the case in the real world, they would still 
need to overcome two dual informational problems prior to 
adopting a subsidization plan: they would need to decide which 
green technology to subsidize and by what amount. Failure to 
make both decisions correctly will distort competition among 
green technology companies by channeling excessive amounts 
 
 162. Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is 
Motivating State and Local Governments To Address a Global Problem and 
What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAW. 
1015, 1016–20 (2006). 
 163. See supra Part I.B.  
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of public funds into the wrong hands. However, given the early 
stage at which subsidization decisions ought to be made and in 
the absence of market feedback, the government cannot possi-
bly make the correct decisions.  
Second, once we move from the ideal world of Pigouvian 
government that only acts in the best interest of the public to 
the real world in which at least some politicians seek to maxim-
ize their narrow self-interest over that of the public, the short-
comings of subsidization rush to the fore. There is a voluminous 
literature documenting how politicians use subsidies to benefit 
their supporters, rather than the public at large.164 In light of 
our past experience with subsidization, it is highly unlikely 
that the resources will be allocated optimally, and, worse yet, a 
considerable amount of money will be squandered in the pro-
cess as private corporations will engage in fierce, albeit unpro-
ductive, competition for the subsidies doled out by the govern-
ment.165 
Third, and finally, subsidies come from the public fisc. 
They use up money that could have been used to advance other 
important public goals. Alternatively, the government could 
raise the funds necessary to subsidize a certain economic activi-
ty by raising taxes. However, politicians are highly disinclined 
to levy new taxes on the public or even to raise existing ones. 
Furthermore, it bears emphasis that taxation creates its own 
economic costs, including a considerable deadweight loss.166 
Our solution, by comparison, sidesteps the main problems 
that attend subsidization. Our solution relies on the market ra-
ther than on the political system. Although markets are far 
from perfect, they have several critical advantages in the pre-
sent context. Markets do not only allocate goods and services to 
their highest value users; they produce valuable information in 
the process.167 Furthermore, market competition is the best way 
 
 164. BRUCE E. CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE 
AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 197–98 (1987); Avinash Dixit & John 
Londregan, The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive 
Politics, 58 J. POL. 1132, 1133 (1996); Herbert Kitschelt, Linkages Between Cit-
izens and Politicians in Democratic Polities, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 845, 849 
(2000); Rigoberto A. Lopez, Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsi-
dies, 13 ECON. & POL. 257, 271–72 (2001).  
 165. Green, supra note 128, at 426.  
 166. Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates, Policy Analysis in the Presence of 
Distorting Taxes, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 603, 604 (2000). 
 167. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 
526 (1945).  
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we have of ensuring the success of the best technologies.168 Over 
time, competition tends to select the more efficient technologies 
and channel resources in their direction. Our proposal provides 
a helpful illustration of the advantages of competition. Under 
our proposal, established businesses can turn down a green op-
tion as long as they have invested in rival green technology. 
The opt-out mechanism that is built into our proposal enhances 
competition in two related ways. First, it gives established 
businesses an incentive to educate themselves about the green 
technologies that are available on the market and actively 
search for the best ones. Second, it gives green companies an 
extra motivation to improve their processes and products. Un-
der our proposal, green companies cannot get complacent and 
rely on the green option to bail them out because if their tech-
nology is not good enough, established businesses will turn 
down the option and invest instead in the superior technology 
of another company.  
A final advantage of our proposal is that it does not require 
public spending. Consequently, it does not give rise to the fa-
miliar political economy objections that attend subsidization. 
First and foremost, it does not raise the specter of corruption. 
By preserving open market competition, we make sure that all 
investment decisions will be made strictly on the merits. An es-
tablished business that invests based on favoritism will quickly 
lose its investment and be disciplined by the market. Second, 
our proposal frees up public money for other important purpos-
es. It will bestow a benefit on the public without exposing it to 
any significant cost.169 Thus, from a societal perspective, there 
are weighty reasons to favor our proposal over subsidization.  
 
 168. See, e.g., Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available 
Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1212–29 (2011); Philip J. 
Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 534, 583–600 (2003). 
 169. One could argue that by forcing public corporations to invest in green 
technologies we may bring about the downfall of many established businesses, 
which will lead to an economic crisis. We find this scenario is unfounded. For 
this result to happen, all, or at least most, established businesses should lose 
considerable amounts of money because of their investment in green technolo-
gies. It is virtually impossible to imagine a world in which this risk will mate-
rialize. Green technologies do not present such a risk. In fact, most green 
technologies represent an opportunity for the recipient firms to improve their 
operations and become more profitable.  
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III.  ADDRESSING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS: SHOULD 
OUR PROPOSAL GET THE GREEN LIGHT?   
In this Part, we would like to address several potential ob-
jections to our proposal. We believe that in addition to the more 
specific objections that we explored in Part II as we were laying 
out our proposal, one can come up with three more general ob-
jections. First, one could argue that the concept of “green tech-
nology” that lies at the core of our proposal is too vague and as 
a consequence our proposal may be subject to manipulation. 
Second, one might contend that the government has no busi-
ness intervening in the operations of private corporations and 
should certainly stay out of their investment decisions. Third, 
and finally, one may wonder why focus on the environment 
when there are other worthy social goals that may be equally 
important. We take on these objections in order.  
A. WHAT’S GREEN? 
The first objection to our proposal centers on the concept of 
“green technology.” Adopting a cynical perspective, one could 
argue that under a very lax definition any technology can be 
defined as “green.”170 After all, green technologies are not self-
identifying and what is environmentally friendly is open to de-
bate.171 If this is the case, established businesses can easily ma-
nipulate our system by investing in any technology.  
While the concept of green technology is central to our pro-
posal, we do not consider the problem insurmountable. In fact, 
we posit that there is a simple fix. The task of defining what 
technologies are green is not nearly as daunting as one might 
think. In our opinion, the task of defining what constitutes a 
green technology should not be performed by the government. 
Rather, it should be left to the market, or more specifically, to 
 
 170. Here we could not help but be reminded of Oscar Wilde’s famous defi-
nition of a cynic. Wilde famously defined a cynic as “[a] man who knows the 
price of everything and the value of nothing.” OSCAR WILDE, Lady Winder-
mere’s Fan, in THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST AND OTHER PLAYS 45 (Pe-
ter Raby ed., Clarendon Press 1995) (1892). Wilde’s definition is very fitting in 
our case.  
 171. See Elizabeth K. Coppolecchia, Note, The Greenwashing Deluge: Who 
Will Rise Above the Waters of Deceptive Advertising?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1353, 1401–02 (2010) (arguing that courts and laypeople have trouble deter-
mining the validity of “environmentally friendly” claims because of a lack of 
any objective criteria). 
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private certification organizations.172 Such certification organi-
zations need not be invented or created; they are already in ex-
istence. At present, there are several certification organizations 
that award green certification marks to businesses that meet 
certain predetermined criteria.173 Those certification organiza-
tions can also be relied upon for the purpose of implementing 
our proposal. Only companies who receive a green certification 
mark from a reputed certification organization would be enti-
tled to use the green option.  
At this point, one may wonder what would stop corpora-
tions that seek to evade our scheme from establishing a new 
certification organization that would award bogus green certifi-
cation marks to businesses that do not deserve to receive 
them.174 Once again, we are unfazed by this possibility. There 
are two simple ways to stem concern with strategic abuse. The 
first way is to adopt a rule that only certification organizations 
that have been in existence for ten years or more prior to the 
adoption of our proposal would have the power to award green 
certification marks. The imposition of this limitation would 
preemptively bar attempts to rig our system by establishing 
fraudulent certification bodies.  
While we are mindful of the fact that there will be a certain 
time lag between the adoption of our proposal into law and its 
use in practice, the lag should be much shorter than ten years. 
As a result, even established businesses that are ideologically 
opposed to our plan will have to act in accordance with it and 
invest in green technologies. After that point, they will no long-
er be motivated to try to manipulate the system.  
 
 172. The certification is typically given via certification marks. For discus-
sion of certification marks, see BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, AND BUSINESS TORTS 40 (2011) (“Certification marks serve to 
certify conformity with centralized standards. . . . [They] are meant to bear the 
‘seal of approval’ of a central organization . . . .”).  
 173. Examples include Green Mark certification (GREEN MARK, 
http://www.greenmark.co.uk/index.php (last visited Dec. 12, 2014)), Green 
Business Bureau certification (GREEN BUSINESS BUREAU, http://www.gbb.org 
(last visited Dec. 12, 2014)), Green Seal certification (GREEN SEAL, 
http://www.greenseal.org/GreenBusiness/Certification.aspx (last visited Dec. 
12, 2014)), and Green Business certification (INSTITUTE FOR GREEN BUSINESS 
CERTIFICATION, http://www.gbcertified.com/11-Home.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 
2014)).  
 174. Jorgen Wouters, ‘Tested Green’ Certification Scam Busted by FTC, 
DAILYFINANCE (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/01/12/tested 
-green-certification-scam-busted-by-ftc. 
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A second possible response to the possibility of manipula-
tion is to get the government involved in an overseer capacity. 
Specifically, the government can be given the power to decide 
which certification organizations can be trusted with the task 
of awarding green certification marks. It bears emphasis that 
the government will not be required to select a single certifica-
tion organization for the purpose of implementing our scheme. 
On the contrary, under our vision, there will be multiple certifi-
cation organizations that will compete among themselves. This 
way, no single certification organization will be able to charge 
monopolistic prices to green technology companies. The role of 
the government should therefore be limited to that of a gate-
keeper: it should ensure that fraudulent certification organiza-
tions do not take advantage of the system.  
Of course, the two aforementioned mechanisms could be 
combined. The government, in performing its role, can pre-
scribe that only certification organizations with an adequate 
past record and a sufficiently long history of operation will be 
eligible to award the green technology certification mark. To-
gether, these steps should suffice to assuage the risk of abuse, 
especially if these measures will be backed by criminal penal-
ties and civil sanctions on manipulators.  
B. WHOSE GREEN? 
Another possible objection to our proposal is that the gov-
ernment should not intervene in the decision making processes 
of private corporations. Corporations, so the argument goes, 
should not be burdened with the task of furthering social 
goals.175 The goal of corporations is to maximize profits for 
stockholders and not worry about the public at large. Of course, 
corporations could be regulated in order to prevent harm to 
third parties, but they should not be required to affirmatively 
promote social goals that include the environment. In sum, the 
argument can be summarized as follows: corporations should 
worry about the “green” in their shareholders’ bank accounts 
and not about the green in nature.176 
We find this objection somewhat anachronistic. This is not 
the place to rehearse the entire normative debate on corporate 
responsibility. Nor is it necessary to do so here. We live in the 
 
 175. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History 
for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441–42 (2001). 
 176. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th anniversary 
ed. 2002). 
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age of regulation.177 No economic activity is completely immune 
from the government’s regulatory powers.178 Nor should it be. In 
a society where most resources are in private hands and actors 
have extensive discretion to use them as they please, it is nec-
essary to impose certain constraints on market transactions in 
order to ensure that they do not lead all of us astray.  
Nor is it true as a factual matter that the government can 
only regulate to prevent harm, but cannot use its regulatory 
powers in order to secure a benefit. Moreover, the distinction 
between harm prevention and benefit conferral is not very use-
ful in the environmental context.179 For example, when the gov-
ernment regulates the use of environmentally sensitive ameni-
ties in order to prevent their destruction, is it employing its 
regulatory powers to prevent harm or to secure a benefit? 
There is no obvious answer to this question. But there is an 
even greater problem with the harm/benefit distinction. One 
may wonder why we should wait until the environment is actu-
ally harmed—possibly irreparably—in order to impose regula-
tions, instead of preempting the problem. After all, if protecting 
the environment is a worthy goal, what is the point of waiting 
until harm occurs? Indeed, in the eminent domain context, 
courts have abandoned the distinction between harm preven-
tion and benefit conferral and have allowed the government to 
impose far-reaching restrictions on the use of environmental 
resources without requiring it to pay compensation to the own-
ers.180 
One may nonetheless argue that our proposal “goes too far” 
in that it forces established businesses to take a stake in green 
 
 177. JAMES A. LOWE & MARK L. WAKEFIELD, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 67:37 (3d ed. 2000) (“We live in an age of regulation . . . .”); Kim-
berly Koscielniak, Litigation Searching, 83 MICH. B.J., May 2004, at 45 (“[I]n 
this age of regulation. . . .”); David Levi-Faur & Jacint Jordana, Preface: The 
Making of a New Regulatory Order, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 
6 (2005) (quoting Scott Jacobs, the head of the program on regulatory reform 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, as stating, 
“we live in the golden age of regulation”).  
 178. See Douglass C. North, The Growth of Government in the United 
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companies.181 We disagree. We do not view our proposal as par-
ticularly extreme or invasive. The law constrains corporate be-
havior in a myriad of ways. The law controls information dis-
closure by corporations,182 prescribes compensation methods,183 
and mandates certain governance structures.184 In certain cas-
es, the law goes further and limits the investment choices of 
certain financial establishments, forcing them to avoid invest-
ment opportunities that involve excessive risk.185 It is notewor-
thy that in response to the 2008 economic crisis a growing 
number of theorists proposed that such limitations be used 
more extensively.186 True, our proposal differs from existing re-
strictions in that it imposes an affirmative investment obliga-
tion on established businesses. However, it would not be the 
first time that the law imposes an affirmative duty on corpora-
tions. Many of the legal rules that pertain to information dis-
closure, compensation methods, and corporate governance im-
pose affirmative duties on corporations.187  
Moreover, we do not think that much should turn on the 
distinction between affirmative regulation that requires per-
formance of certain acts and negative regulation that requires 
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tion, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 397, 398 (2010). 
 184. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1; Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Cor-
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brid Securities 3–5 (Council on Foreign Relations, Working Paper, 2009).  
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abstaining from certain activities. Rather, it is the nature and 
the extent of the interference that should matter. Our proposal 
represents a relatively modest encroachment on the autonomy 
of established corporations. Obviously, it requires large corpo-
rations to take a stake in smaller green companies. But it 
leaves large corporations extensive freedom in deciding which 
green companies to choose. Furthermore, it does not entail a 
considerable interference in the business activities of the re-
ceiving firm. Nor does it expose the receiving firm to a high lev-
el of risk.  
Finally, we would like to note that there are many exam-
ples of legal mechanisms that incorporate call (and even put) 
options. The most famous example is the government power of 
eminent domain.188 The government essentially holds a call op-
tion on all private property.189 It can exercise this option as long 
as it meets the “public use” requirements and it pays the owner 
“just compensation.”190 Interestingly, the government exercised 
its takings power to further distributional goals191 and spark 
economic growth,192 and the Supreme Court approved these ex-
ercises of the takings power even when the title to the taken 
properties was transferred by the government into private 
hands. More importantly, perhaps, there exist multiple exam-
ples of legal rules that grant call and put options to private ac-
tors. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many states 
adopted “mill acts” that empowered private actors to condemn 
land suitable for the operation of mills.193 Also, in the nine-
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teenth century, railroad companies were empowered to take 
private property in order to facilitate the construction of 
tracks.194 But the use of options is not merely a thing of the 
past. At present, the laws of many states resolve encroachment 
disputes by granting the encroached upon party a call option on 
the projecting structure, or a put option that enables her to 
force a sale of the encroached upon land to the encroacher.195 In 
sum, our mechanism will be breaking no new ground as far as 
the use of options in the law is concerned.  
C. WHY GREEN? 
A final objection to our proposal centers on our focus on en-
vironmental goals. After all, there are many other worthy social 
goals that policymakers should strive to advance. Why then 
should the environment take precedence over other important 
social goals?196 For example, why shouldn’t we force corpora-
tions to invest in health-related innovation or education insti-
tutions, rather than in green technologies?  
Actually, we do not disagree. We do not presume to provide 
a cardinal or even ordinal ranking of social values. Such an un-
dertaking is clearly beyond the scope of this Article. This does 
not mean, however, that our proposal should be rejected. Quite 
the contrary. First, the fact that there may be difficulties in 
ranking social goals must not create governmental impasse. 
Those difficulties do not allow the government to sit idly and 
refrain from promoting any social goals.  
Second, and most important, although our discussion fo-
cuses on the environment, the mechanism we developed in this 
Article may be used to further other socially important goals. 
Indeed, it can easily be extended to other contexts. Specifically, 
lawmakers can agree on a list of goals they wish to further—
without ranking them—and empower small enterprises that 
promote those goals to harness the help of large businesses by 
giving them call options. Of course, in this scenario, large cor-
porations will only be required to engage in the advancement of 
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one social interest. Hence, large establishments will have to 
choose which social goals they prefer to promote, with their 
choice being motivated by profit. 
Viewed in this light, our proposal may hold the key not on-
ly to the advancement of environmental goals, but also for oth-
er important values. Clearly, one should proceed with caution. 
Our mechanism will not work in all settings. For example, the 
education sector is populated by many non-profit organizations. 
Clearly, our mechanism is not suitable for non-profits. Fur-
thermore, it is necessary to examine carefully the costs and 
benefits of involving large businesses in the furtherance of eve-
ry social goal. Also, alternative methods should be weighed in 
every case. In the education context for example, taxation and 
public funding may yield better results than our mechanism. 
More generally, we do not argue that our mechanism will al-
ways work. Nor do we argue that it will always outperform the 
alternatives. We do claim, however, that our mechanism should 
be added to the list of options available to policymakers and 
should be implemented in appropriate circumstances.  
  CONCLUSION   
In this Article, we introduced an innovative market-based 
mechanism intended to advance environmental goals. Our con-
tribution can be seen as an answer to a call from environmental 
economics to supplement the use of a familiar environmental 
policy instrument with a targeted ecologically-oriented technol-
ogy policy. Our mechanism employs option theory to give estab-
lished businesses a financial stake in the success of green tech-
nologies.  
Going against the conventional wisdom among corporate 
law scholars, our analysis demonstrated that markets may be 
harnessed to advance broader social goals. Furthermore, we 
showed that market-oriented mechanisms can be superior to 
government based incentive schemes. Markets have several ob-
vious advantages over subsidization or conventional modes of 
regulation. Markets produce valuable information about the 
quality of products and services as well as about prices. Moreo-
ver, the market process aggregates social preferences better 
than regulators can ever do. Finally, the market process side-
steps the political economy problems that plague political deci-
sion making. Despite the obvious advantages of markets, they 
are rarely used to advance social goals. In our opinion, this is 
an anomaly.  
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An important lesson from our analysis is that the profit 
motive of corporations can be put at the service of broader so-
cial goals. The challenge for policymakers is to adopt the right 
incentive scheme that best aligns the narrow self-interest of 
firms with the broader societal interest. In this Article, we ex-
plained how it can be done. All it takes is a change in the way 
we think about our institutions and the goals they are supposed 
to achieve.  
 
